#### CT437 COMPUTER SECURITY AND FORENSIC COMPUTING

#### SECURE NETWORK COMMUNICATION PRINCIPALS

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#### Lecture Overview

This lecture will look in more detail into how data encryption and hashing mechanisms can be applied to provide secure peer-to-peer data communication over an (unsecure) network





#### Lecture Overview

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- Symmetric block and stream ciphers allow the encryption of data in transit
  - Needs robust key management and distribution
- Hash functions / MACs allow authentication of data in transit
- Digital certificates allow end-point authentication
- Hashing and encryption provide mechanisms to address some of security attack types on information in transit
  - Example Wireshark
- This lecture will look in more detail into how these mechanisms can be applied to provide secure peer-to-peer data communication over a network





## Issues with the IP Protocol

- IP payload is not encrypted (no confidentiality) and can be manipulated in transit
- $\square$  IP header fields can be manipulated in transit (CRC can be adjusted on-the-fly  $\rightarrow$  next slide)
  - IP addresses can be spoofed (no authentication)
- IP header has mutable fields that can change during datagram transport

| <ul> <li>✓ 32 Bits —</li> </ul> |         |                 |            |                 |  |  |  |  |
|---------------------------------|---------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|--|--|--|--|
|                                 |         |                 |            |                 |  |  |  |  |
| Version                         | IHL     | Type of service |            | Total length    |  |  |  |  |
|                                 | ldentif | ication         | D M<br>F F | Fragment offset |  |  |  |  |
| Time 1                          | o live  | Protocol        |            | Header checksum |  |  |  |  |
|                                 |         | Source          | address    |                 |  |  |  |  |
|                                 |         | Destinatio      | n address  |                 |  |  |  |  |
| Options (0 or more words)       |         |                 |            |                 |  |  |  |  |

#### Recap: Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)



### Issues with the Transport Layer Protocol (Example TCP)

- TCP payload is not encrypted (no confidentiality) and can be manipulated in transit
- TCP header fields can be manipulated in transit (CRC can be adjusted)
  - TPDUs can be rearranged in transit via manipulating sequence and acknowledgement numbers

|                         |            |     | 1   | 1     | 1           | 1     | <u>і                                    </u> |                   |
|-------------------------|------------|-----|-----|-------|-------------|-------|--|-------------------|
|                         | Source por | t   |     |       |             |       |  | Destination port  |
|                         |            |     |     |       | Se          | eque  | ∍nc  | e number          |
|                         |            |     |     | Acł   | kno         | wlee  | dge  | ment number       |
| TCP<br>header<br>length |            | URG | AUK | P S H | R<br>S<br>T | 2 × 0 | Е – Z  | Window size       |
|                         | Checksum   |     |     |       |             |       |  | Urgent pointer    |
|                         |            |     | Or  | otior | ns (        | 0 01  | ma   | pre 32-bit words) |
| L<br>T                  |            |     |     |       |             | Data  | a (o   | ptional)          |

#### TCP/IP Header Hierarchy



#### Example MACsec

#### Ethernet frame and its payload



#### Ethernet frame and its payload, using MACsec (encryption enabled)

Ethernet

### **Encryption Coverage Implications**

| Γ | Link-H | Net-H | IP-H | TCP-H | Data | Link-T |
|---|--------|-------|------|-------|------|--------|
| _ |        |       |      |       |      |        |

(a) Application-level encryption (on links and at routers and gateways)

| Link-H | Net-H | IP-H | TCP-H               | Data   | Link-T |
|--------|-------|------|---------------------|--------|--------|
|        |       |      | On links and at r   | outers |        |
| Link-H | Net-H | IP-H | TCP-H               | Data   | Link-T |
|        |       |      | In gateways         |        |        |
|        |       |      | (b) TCP-level encry | ption  |        |

| TCP-H  | - | TCP header   |
|--------|---|--|
| IP-H   | _ | IP header  |
| Net-H  |   | Network-level header (e.g., X.25 packet header, LLC header |
| Link-H | - | Data link control protocol header                          |
| Link T | - | Data link control protocol trailer                         |

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### **Encryption Coverage Implications**

| Link-H     | Net-H          | IP-H   | TCP-H                           | I Data   | Link-T               |
|------------|----------------|--------|---------------------------------|--|----------------------|
|            |                |        | On                              | links  |                      |
| Link-H     | Net-H          | IP-H   | TCP-H                           | I Data   | Link-T               |
| Shading in | dicates encryj | ption. | TCP-H =<br>IP-H =               | TCP header<br>IP header  |                      |
|            |                |        | Net-H =<br>Link-H =<br>Link-T = | Data link control protocol header<br>Data link control protocol header | packet header, LLC h |



# Example for an unsecure network security protocol

### Wire Equivalent Privacy (WEP)

- The first attempt of encrypting 802.11 (Wi-Fi) communication
- It was the de-facto 802.11 security protocol for a couple of years, implemented in all Wi-Fi routers at the time
- However, it has a flawed design and has been broken in the early 2000s
  - It is completely obsolete by now Don't use it!
- Nonetheless it makes a good case study...

### 802.11 Summary

- Wireless network protocol, operates on 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz carrier frequency
- The base version of this IEEE standard was released in 1997, with various amendments since
- In the common infrastructure mode networks are organise as wireless network basic service set (BSS)
- A BSS consists of one redistribution point (i.e., an access point) together with one or more client stations that are associated with it
- Each BSS has a
  - unique id (BSSID), like a 48 medium access sublayer (MAC) address
  - Customisable name, the Service Set ID (SSID)
- 802.11 is based on the exchange of plaintext messages and as such prone to Wi-Fi eavesdropping too (→ Wireshark)

#### BSS, BSSID and SSID



#### Recall: The 802.3 MAC Sublayer Protocol



#### □ Simpler than 802.3 packet structure:



#### WEP Overview

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- WEP was ratified as a Wi-Fi security standard in 1999
- Two main flavours,
  - WEP-40 (40-bit secret key plus 24-bit shared initialisation vector), i.e., 64-bit WEP
  - WEP-104 (104-bit secret key plus 24-bit shared initialisation vector), i.e., 128-bit WEP
- □ WEP uses
  - the stream cipher RC4 for confidentiality
  - the CRC-32 checksum for integrity
- Both flavours were deprecated in 2004 (!)
- The WEP header is shown on the right with encrypted sections highlighted in dark
  - Note the (24-bit) plaintext initialisation vector is incremented with every packet



#### WEP Encoding

- A secret BSS key K<sub>BSS</sub> (40 bit or 104 bit) is shared between the AP and all clients
- Every Wi-Fi packet contains a random 24-bit initialisation vector
   IV chosen by the sender
- $\square$  IV  $| | K_{BSS}$  is the seed for an RC4 stream cipher (WEP PRNG)
- The payload M is complemented by a 32-bit CRC (cyclicredundancy-checksum) and bitwise EXORed with the key stream
- The resulting encrypted message is complemented with the IV and transmitted

#### WEP Encoding



## Recap: RC4 as used in WEP

- RC4 is a stream cipher
- It consists of a
  - key-scheduling algorithm (KSA) and a
  - pseudo-random generation algorithm (PRGA)
- The KSA uses IV ¦ K<sub>BSS</sub> as a key to initialise the algorithm
- Subsequently the PRGA returns pseudo-random byte at a time

#### WEP Weaknesses

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- Because RC4 is a stream cipher, the same traffic key must never be used twice
- The purpose of an IV, which is transmitted as plain text, is to prevent any repetition, but a 24-bit IV is not long enough to ensure this on a busy network
  - 16,777,216 different RC4 cipher streams when the IV is just incremented
  - Even worse, when a new IV is randomly picked for each packet, there is a 50% probability the same IV will repeat after 5,000 packets (Birthday paradox)
- There's a range of WEP attacks that takes advantage of that

#### Summary

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  - Network security (i.e., data encryption and / or authentication) is important for obvious reasons
  - The layered structure of the TCP/IP stack allows positioning the extra security layer in different levels
- Each of these options has its advantages and disadvantages / limitations, for example with regard to
  - the portions of a packet that can be secured
  - compatibility with network routing, NAT, etc.
- WEP as a much weaker and depreciated option shows how encryption / authentication may take place on data-link layer