[CT421]: Add Assignment 2 code
This commit is contained in:
311
year4/semester2/CT421/assignments/assignment2/code/ipd.py
Executable file
311
year4/semester2/CT421/assignments/assignment2/code/ipd.py
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#!/usr/bin/python3
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import argparse
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import random
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def initialise_population(size):
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"""
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Initialises a population of strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
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Args:
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size (int): The size of the population
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Returns:
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population (list): A list of strategies
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"""
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# Each strategy is defined as follows:
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# [first move, reaction to defection, reaction to co-operation]
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# where 0 is defection and 1 is co-operation
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# I don't actually know the names for all of these strategies so I'm going to make some up:
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strategies = [
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[0, 0, 0], # Always defect.
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[0, 0, 1], # Grim tit-for-tat.
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[0, 1, 0], # Grim opposite day: defect at first, then do opposite of what opponent did last.
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[0, 1, 1], # Self-sabotage: defect at first, then always co-operate.
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[1, 0, 0], # Feint co-operation, then always defect.
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[1, 0, 1], # Tit-for-tat.
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[1, 1, 0], # Opposite day: co-operate at first, then do opposite of what opponent did last.
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[1, 1, 1] # Always co-operate.
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]
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# Since there are only 8 possible strategies, to initialise the population just perform a random over-sampling of the space.
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return random.choices(strategies, k=size)
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def coevolve(agent1, agent2, num_iterations):
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"""
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Play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with two agents a specified number of times, and return each agent's score.
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Args:
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agent1 (list): the strategy of agent1.
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agent2 (list): the strategy of agent2.
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iterations (int): the number of iterations to play.
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Returns:
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fitness1 (int): the score obtained by agent1.
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fitness2 (int): the score obtained by agent2.
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"""
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fitness1 = 0
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fitness2 = 0
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agent1_last_move = None
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agent2_last_move = None
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for iteration in range(num_iterations):
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if (iteration == 0):
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agent1_move = agent1[0]
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agent2_move = agent2[0]
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else:
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# Set an agent's move to its reaction to co-operation if the other agent's last move was co-operation (1), else set it to its reaction to defection.
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agent1_move = agent1[2] if agent2_last_move else agent1[1]
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agent2_move = agent2[2] if agent1_last_move else agent2[1]
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match (agent1_move, agent2_move):
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case (0, 0):
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fitness1 += 1
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fitness2 += 1
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case (0, 1):
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fitness1 += 5
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case (1, 0):
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fitness2 += 5
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case (1, 1):
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fitness1 += 3
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fitness2 += 3
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return fitness1, fitness2
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def fitness(agent, num_iterations):
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"""
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Play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma against a number of fixed strategies and return its score.
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Args:
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agent1 (list): the strategy of agent1.
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iterations (int): the number of iterations to play.
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Returns:
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fitness1 (int): the score obtained by agent1.
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"""
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fitness = 0
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fixed_strategies = [
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[0, 0, 0], # Always defect.
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# [0, 0, 1], # Grim tit-for-tat.
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[0, 1, 0], # Grim opposite day: defect at first, then do opposite of what opponent did last.
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# [0, 1, 1], # Self-sabotage: defect at first, then always co-operate.
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# [1, 0, 0], # Feint co-operation, then always defect.
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[1, 0, 1], # Tit-for-tat.
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# [1, 1, 0], # Opposite day: co-operate at first, then do opposite of what opponent did last.
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[1, 1, 1] # Always co-operate.
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]
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for fixed_strategy in fixed_strategies:
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agent_last_move = None
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fixed_strategy_last_move = None
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for iteration in range(num_iterations):
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if (iteration == 0):
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agent_move = agent[0]
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fixed_strategy_move = fixed_strategy[0]
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else:
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# Set an agent's move to its reaction to co-operation if the other agent's last move was co-operation (1), else set it to its reaction to defection.
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agent_move = agent[2] if fixed_strategy_last_move else agent[1]
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fixed_strategy_move = fixed_strategy[2] if agent_last_move else fixed_strategy[1]
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agent_last_move = agent_move
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fixed_strategy_last_move = fixed_strategy_move
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match (agent_move, fixed_strategy_move):
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case (0, 0):
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fitness += 1
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case (0, 1):
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fitness += 5
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case (1, 0):
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fitness += 0
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case (1, 1):
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fitness += 3
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return fitness
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def list_fitnesses(population, num_iterations):
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"""
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Calculate the fitness of each agent in a population.
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Args:
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population (list): the population of strategies.
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iterations (int): the number of iterations to play.
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Returns:
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fitnesses (list): the fitness of each agent.
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"""
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fitnesses = []
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for agent in population:
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fitnesses.append(fitness(agent, num_iterations))
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return fitnesses
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def get_best(population, fitnesses, generation):
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"""
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Get the best agent in a population, given a list of fitnesses.
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Args:
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population (list): the population of strategies.
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fitnesses (list): the fitness of each agent.
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Returns:
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best_agent (list): the best agent.
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"""
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best_index = fitnesses.index(max(fitnesses))
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best_agent = {
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"strategy": list(population[best_index]),
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"fitness": fitnesses[best_index],
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"generation": generation
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}
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return best_agent
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def tournament_selection(population, fitnesses, num_survivors, tournament_size=3):
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"""
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Select agents from a population based on their fitness.
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Args:
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population (list): the population of strategies.
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fitnesses (list): the fitness of each agent.
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num_survivors (int): the number of agents to select.
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Returns:
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survivors (list): the selected agents.
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"""
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survivors = []
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for _ in range(num_survivors):
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tournament = random.sample(list(zip(population, fitnesses)), tournament_size)
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winner = max(tournament, key=lambda agent: agent[1])
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survivors.append(winner[0])
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return survivors
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def crossover(parents, crossover_rate, num_offspring):
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"""
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Perform single-point crossover on selected parents.
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Args:
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parents (list): List of selected strategies.
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crossover_rate (float): Probability of crossover occurring.
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num_offspring (int): Number of offspring to generate.
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Returns:
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offspring (list): List of new strategies.
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"""
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offspring = []
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while len(offspring) < num_offspring:
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if random.random() < crossover_rate:
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p1, p2 = random.sample(parents, 2)
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crossover_point = random.randint(1, 2)
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child1 = p1[:crossover_point] + p2[crossover_point:]
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child2 = p2[:crossover_point] + p1[crossover_point:]
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offspring.extend([child1, child2])
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else:
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offspring.append(random.choice(parents))
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return offspring[:num_offspring]
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def mutate(offspring, mutation_rate):
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"""
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Perform bit-flip mutation on offspring.
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Args:
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offspring (list): List of offspring strategies.
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mutation_rate (float): Probability of mutation occurring per individual.
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Returns:
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mutated_offspring (list): List of mutated strategies.
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"""
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for i in range(len(offspring)):
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if random.random() < mutation_rate:
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mutation_point = random.randint(0, 2)
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offspring[i][mutation_point] = 1 - offspring[i][mutation_point]
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return offspring
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def evolve(size, num_generations, give_up_after, num_iterations, selection_proportion, crossover_rate, mutation_rate):
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"""
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Evolves strategies over a number of generations for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
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Args:
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size (int): Initial population size
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num_generations (int): Number of generations
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give_up_after (int): Number of generations to give up after if best solution has remained unchanged
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selection_proportion (float): The proportion of the population to be selected (survive) on each generation
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crossover_rate (float): Probability of a selected pair of solutions to sexually reproduce
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mutation_rate (float): Probability of a selected offspring to undergo mutation
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Returns:
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results (str): The results of the evolution in TSV format
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"""
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population = initialise_population(size)
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fitnesses = list_fitnesses(population, num_iterations)
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current_best = get_best(population, fitnesses, 0)
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results = ["Generation\tFitness\tStrategy"]
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results.append(f"{current_best['generation']}\t{current_best['fitness']}\t{current_best['strategy']}")
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for generation in range(1, num_generations):
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population = tournament_selection(population, fitnesses, int(len(population) *selection_proportion))
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offspring = crossover(population, crossover_rate, size - len(population))
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population += mutate(offspring, mutation_rate)
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fitnesses = list_fitnesses(population, num_iterations)
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generation_best = get_best(population, fitnesses, generation)
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if (generation_best['fitness'] > current_best['fitness']):
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current_best = generation_best
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print(f"New best strategy: {current_best['strategy']}, {current_best['fitness']}")
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results.append(f"{current_best['generation']}\t{current_best['fitness']}\t{current_best['strategy']}")
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if (generation - current_best['generation'] >= give_up_after):
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break
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print(f"Best strategy: {current_best['strategy']}")
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print(f"Fitness: {current_best['fitness']}")
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print(f"Generation: {current_best['generation']}")
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return results
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Program to evolve strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma")
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parser.add_argument("-s", "--size", type=int, help="Initial population size", required=False, default=75)
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parser.add_argument("-g", "--num-generations", type=int, help="Number of generations", required=False, default=500)
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parser.add_argument("-a", "--give-up-after", type=int, help="Number of generations to give up after if best solution has remained unchanged", required=False, default=100)
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parser.add_argument("-i", "--num-iterations", type=int, help="Number of iterations of the dilemma between two agents", required=False, default=10)
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parser.add_argument("-p", "--selection-proportion", type=float, help="The proportion of the population to be selected (survive) on each generation", required=False, default=0.2)
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parser.add_argument("-c", "--crossover-rate", type=float, help="Probability of a selected pair of solutions to sexually reproduce", required=False, default=0.8)
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parser.add_argument("-m", "--mutation-rate", type=float, help="Probability of a selected offspring to undergo mutation", required=False, default=0.2)
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parser.add_argument("-o", "--output-file", type=str, help="File to write TSV results to", required=False, default="output.tsv")
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args=parser.parse_args()
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results = evolve(args.size, args.num_generations, args.give_up_after, args.num_iterations, args.selection_proportion, args.crossover_rate, args.mutation_rate)
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if (args.output_file):
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with open(args.output_file, "w") as f:
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for result in results:
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f.write(result + "\n")
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102
year4/semester2/CT421/assignments/assignment2/code/output.tsv
Normal file
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year4/semester2/CT421/assignments/assignment2/code/output.tsv
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Generation Fitness Strategy
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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0 120 [0, 0, 0]
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||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
0 120 [0, 0, 0]
|
||||||
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user